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25 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: IAC Discussion on Collaboration of Intelligence Estimators and U. S. Operators and Planners in the Preparation of Certain Studies (23 April 1951)

1. On the question of the disposition of scheduled NIEs (*) requiring inclusion of information on U. S. military plans and strengths in order to make them useful estimates, there was considerable discussion of the jurisdiction of the IAC and of Intelligence in this field.
2. Reference was made to the view of the JCS regarding NIE-30, namely, that the McMahon request was not made on proper authority nor was it made to the proper agency and that nothing further could be done with the IAC draft estimate in view of General Marshall's letter.
3. With respect to NIE-13 it was indicated that the assessment of the adequacy of Western European Defense arrangements was mainly a policy or operations matter, although it was recognized that by a change of title an intelligence estimate could properly be produced assessing the political, psychological, and military factors involved in the ability of the Western European Powers to meet their commitments.
4. There was a consensus on two conclusions:
 - a. that an intelligence appreciation of enemy capabilities without taking into account the capabilities and intentions of the opposing friendly forces (including U.S.) would be vacuous;
 - b. that for the IAC to get into the business of "war-gaming" would be opposed by the JCS and would in fact not be proper or useful.
5. It was recognized that the problem lay in finding some mid-point between these two extremes. There was considerable hope expressed in the arrangements reported by General Huebner and confirmed by General Magee which have been established with the Joint Staff. These arrangements provide that the members of the JIG, who have complete access to operations and policy information including war plans, should be responsible for guiding the intelligence estimators in such a way as to provide the operations or planning information essential to make their estimates useful.

(*) NIE-13: Prospects for the Creation of an Adequate Western European Defense

NIE-30: Soviet Capabilities to Interfere with US Delivery of Atomic Targets in the USSR

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6. General Huebner felt that the State Department had a similar responsibility and might develop a similar arrangement. Mr. Armstrong agreed and indicated that his people are in close contact with policy officers in the Department and as far as he knew were providing adequate and proper guidance for the intelligence estimators.

7. In the case of an estimate on a primarily military subject the view was expressed that this was properly a job for the JIC or JCS rather than the IAC. Mr. Jackson pointed out that the DCI's responsibility (in his capacity as Director of Central Intelligence as opposed to his position as Agency head) might require him to endorse or comment on such a paper even though produced by JIC.

8. The possibility was also raised that the jurisdictional area of Intelligence within which the DCI is responsible may extend further into the operations and planning sphere than the Service intelligence chiefs would be allowed to go.

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